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As I pass through Berlin on my way to this conference on „Peace and Freedom,“ 
I note the many signs that this remains a place scarred by war. Palaces are peppe-
red with pock-marks wrought by bullets ﬁred in anger in a now distant conﬂict, 
while houses of religion wrecked by allied bombs remain as they stood in 1945, 
monuments to the penchant of mankind to do itself violence.
I also see a city ready to move on, a place eager to embrace hard work, ingenu-
ity and, somewhat imperfectly, the philosophy of free markets. Berlin is strikingly, 
possibly even self-consciously, new. While Berliners are justly proud of the over 
750 year history of their city, and while ofﬁcials maintain or resurrect the ancient 
or merely old where possible, there seems to be a greater willingness here than in 
many other „old“ places to look forward rather than back.
Most students of world affairs praise the ﬁrst image of Berlin, a place where 
symbols of the horrors of war outnumber the tributes to fallen heroes or to trium-
phant military campaigns. Few scholars, politicians, or peace advocates outside 
of Germany will be unequivocal in their praise for the second image of Berlin, a 
city of prosperity and growing inﬂuence in Europe and abroad. Forgetting the war, 
many will argue, dooms Germany to revisit the bloody horrors of the past (as if the 
preoccupation with static historical „lessons“ does not also carry the risk of error 
or other pathological decision making – such as generals who are always prone to 
„ﬁght the last war”).
Let me argue instead that the second image of Berlin – the one in which ma-
king money and „getting on with things“ trumps solemn remembrance – is de-
cidedly better for world peace. Forgetting does not doom us to repetition unless 
the causes of war in 1938 remain with us today. They do not. The world, and es-
pecially the developed world, has changed in the past sixty years. Indeed, it is the 
dramatic changes that Berlin now exhibits, economically, socially, and politically, 
that offer the most promising prospects for the perpetuation of peace in Europe 
and elsewhere.
The Myth of Recollection
If remembering that war is deadly, wasteful, and morally bad is enough to bring 
peace, then we are in luck. Such a message is easily propagated and internalized. 
Indeed, this is the message that already infuses all of the world’s revealed religi-
ons, and has done so for a millennia, or more in some cases. If memory matters, 
then arguably the best policy for Berliners is to rebuild those bombed out churches, 
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since mute testimony is seldom as engaging as a good sermon, vigorously repeated 
at regular intervals. Reminders in passive voice are easily forgotten or misconst-
rued. Better to preach peace in active houses or worship, amid large and attentive 
ﬂocks.
Of course, this has been done for ages. The temptation to offer up symbols 
when mere words have repeatedly failed is understandable. Yet, at some level, we 
all recognize that remembering war is insufﬁcient and probably ineffective. The 
notion that saccharine sentiments, much less static memorials, might stave off the 
call to arms deﬁes a long history of the inadequacy of such efforts. Indeed, even 
were the public conscious to evolve, how can we be conﬁdent that such a change 
is stable? Improving human nature is difﬁcult work easily undone. Human beings 
are abundantly adept at recalling only what is convenient. Nietzsche bemoaned 
the alacrity with which paciﬁst friends enlisted to ﬁght France in 1870. Rosa Lu-
xemburg railed against her fellow socialists for ignoring their own party platform 
and calling for war with France in 1914. 
Peace does not follow from the desire for peace, any more than appealing 
outcomes necessarily follow good intentions, or for that matter, good government 
derives from virtue in political elites. We cannot build temples to harmony and un-
derstanding – nor indeed fail to rebuilt churches after war – and expect that peace 
will result. Germany, along with much of the developed West, has transformed the 
logic of world affairs in a manner that is historically unprecedented. Many students 
of war will attribute this change to the ﬁrst image of Berlin. Strangely enough, it 
is the Berlin of egoists – of commerce and competition – that is the champion of 
world peace. This will seem counterintuitive to many, but counterintuitive results 
are a hallmark of liberal theory.
Adam Smith and the Social Virtue of Egoists
Much of the Western tradition of political philosophy is not unreasonably preoc-
cupied with the search for methods of rectiﬁcation of individual interest with the 
collective good. Government was needed to provide public goods (to establish civil 
1 Liberals in particular will want to question the scope of public goods arguments for government. 
Much that is said to be public „investment“ is in fact consumption, while many of the activities 
that are conducted by government agencies, such as education, housing, and social welfare have 
analogues in the private sector. Indeed, even when there is a legitimate public goods rationale, 
the tendency is often to conﬂate the need for public ﬁnancing with public production of the 
good. I adopt the much more limited assertion that some public goods beneﬁts are widely 
perceived by populations throughout history, whether these are in fact public or private goods.
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order and domestic security, build roads, etc.)1 , but it was also tempting for the so-
vereign to use the power of the state to redistribute wealth, usually in favor of the 
sovereign and his cronies. The goal that many traditional political philosophers set 
for themselves is to ﬁnd ways to ensure that government did not usurp its needed 
functions and become predatory. The working assumption was most typically that 
enlightened rule necessitated virtuous princes. Since virtue in princes also required 
considerable cultivating, political philosophers conveniently volunteered their ser-
vices. This model of addressing pathologies of principal-agency and other social 
problems by improving the moral ﬁber of decision makers serves, by extension, for 
a great variety of situations to this very day. Professional organizations and busi-
ness groups respond to scandals with calls for education campaigns and required 
courses in ethics. Puritans – and not a few other religious extremists – viewed the 
virtue of entire populations as essential to the promotion of civil peace, amity, 
and prosperity. Politicians, preachers, and popular media ﬁgures grieve in public 
for their misbehavior, requesting forgiveness in return for persuasive promises of 
lessons learned. Of course the skeptic quickly points out that this soul searching 
always appears more intense in front of television cameras than in the shadows 
before, or possibly after, the revelation of misdeeds. 
Where conservative political philosophy hung its hopes on improving princes, 
the radicals of the enlightenment suggested it was better the replace vain prin-
ces with government by the people. Popular rule is certainly better at expressing 
majoritarian interests („the will of the people“), and possibly better at monitoring 
leader performance. Kant thought that citizens would not be willing to ﬁght, ma-
king sovereigns less warlike, though this turns out not to be so.2 Many of the ra-
dical political philosophers imagined in fact that „the people“ were more virtuous 
– or possibly more easily lead by political philosophers – than were princes. Few 
make such arguments today.
The problem in the conventional approach was never one of demand, but of 
supply; virtue is too scarce and variable a commodity on which to place trust, let 
alone one’s life or livelihood. If individual or collective betterment is necessary in 
order for there to be peace then, lets face it, war will return. We should demand 
something better on which to hang my hopes for world peace.
Adam Smith exploded the idea that the perfectibility of the individual was 
necessary in order to achieve virtuous effects. Egoists, intent only on their own 
2 The democratic peace ﬁnding argues that democracies are less prone to war with one another, 
thought they are no less warlike in general. One weakness in this research is the failure to include 
liberal economic determinants of war and peace. See, for example, Gartzke (2005, 2007).
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betterment could collectively yield beneﬁts through interaction in self-regulating 
markets. This conception has gradually suffused much of political philosophy, re-
placing demands for the improvement of princes with the notion that competiti-
on among sovereigns and adjudicated through popular suffrage (i.e. democracy), 
could achieve better government. Rather than bring Moses to the mountain, it is 
increasingly accepted that we must bring the mountain to Moses, adapting in-
stitutions to rectify the incentives of egoists with desired social outcomes, rather 
than attempting to perfect the preferences of princes or populations so that they 
may better regulate the function of arbitrary institutions. In accepting a model of 
incentivization over education, social choice theory extends Adam Smith’s amazing 
idea to politics. The scholarship of Hayak, Arrow, Buchanan, Olson, Tullock, and 
many others paved the way by showing how the proper design of institutions and 
incentives could have an impact on the performance of political systems. I want 
to outline what these incentives might look like that could lead nations, groups, 
or individuals to choose peace over war. Interestingly, the factors that seem most 
likely to encourage nations in particular to refrain from resorting to military vio-
lence are those same mechanisms emphasized by Adam Smith as performing critical 
duties in converting the egoism of individuals into socially virtuous outcomes. Free 
markets and economic prosperity encourage sovereigns and citizens to produce 
and „make“ rather than „take.”
Production Functions for War and for Peace
Individuals, groups, and societies have two basic options in the eternal drive to 
provision. They can make what they need or want, or they can take goods, ser-
vices, or prerogatives from others. This distinction is extremely general, serving to 
differentiate predators from prey, for example, but also separating opportunistic 
behavior by individuals and groups within and across species boundaries (i.e. „ste-
aling“) from efforts to gather or make what one consumes. Two stylized facts, that 
predation occurs, and that it does not seem hard wired into the species – even 
Attila the Hun must have had friends – gives us hope that the relative emphasis 
on make or take can be shifted under certain circumstances. Moving toward world 
peace is not just possible, but in some sense it is merely a technical issue of dis-
covering the rules by which societies allocate effort to theft or to production, and 
then manipulating these factors (the incentivization of peace) in order to make 
the world a less hostile place in which to live. Unfortunately, while the procedure 
may be tractable, the practice is much less so. Like the economist who walks past 
money on the street because „If it were really there, someone would have pocketed 
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it by now,“ simple answers to peace must be treated as suspect, given the effort 
of the search and the limited evidence of effect.
Much of the problem may have been that students of world peace were looking 
in the wrong places. As I have already suggested, the solutions that appeal to those 
most wishing to end war are probably ineffective, while the mechanisms that I think 
matter most are all but unpalatable to peace advocates. Let me begin with a very 
simple bit of theoretical machinery developed by intellectual descendents of Adam 
Smith (known today as „economists“). Jack Hirshleifer is interested in why coun-
tries in particular, but anyone or any group generally, chooses force as a means to 
acquire goods and services, rather than being productive (2000). On a very simple 
level, questions of international peace involve identifying when and whether na-
tions mutually prefer producing to predation. Framed in this way, it would seem 
obvious that there might be a role in promoting peace for a social philosophy that 
emphasizes production over conﬂict, exchange rather than regulation, and auto-
nomy rather than hierarchy – in a word, capitalism.
What is it about capitalism and development that encourages peace? Again, 
we must compare incentives to produce with incentives to steal. Theft takes place 
(or at least is contemplated) when the value of the effort of stealing (to the thief) 
is lower than the beneﬁt acquired from possessing stolen goods or services, dis-
counted by the risk or cost of retribution, and when the effort expended on theft 
cannot be used more proﬁtably in some other manner. This second (italicized) con-
dition is often forgotten and is critical in comparing the production of war and 
peace. Making war (literally) requires that more can be made with war than with 
peace. Donald Trump, or any other rich person, is unlikely to break into your house 
and steal your television set, precisely because such a theft is not worth his or her 
time. Peace can be achieved when the fruits of victory are not worth the time and 
effort required in order to prosecute, or proﬁt from, victory.
This sounds easy. Make war expensive and no one will want to make war. Un-
fortunately, like most valuable but elusive things, peace does not work this way. 
Cobden made this mistake when he predicted that „should war break out between 
two great nations I have no doubt that the immense consumption of material and 
the rapid destruction of property would have the effect of very soon bringing the 
combatants to reason or exhausting their resources“ (Cobden, 1903, page 355). 
This was before Sedan, the Somme, or the Battle of Stalingrad. The inventor of the 
ﬁrst practical machine gun, and the father of high explosives both believed, not 
much to their credit, that making war abominable could lead to peace. Making 
war more deadly primarily leads to more deaths in war. There is some indication 
that war may become less frequent when severe (the interval between European 
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wars increases as the average number of casualties goes up). Yet, this seems the 
most Faustian of bargains, as reapportionment of death tolls is not what most of 
us thinks of when we imagine world peace. Further, the fact that war is costly can 
actually be used to intimidate, coerce, and thus to increase the prospect of ani-
mosity and tension among nations.
Nuclear weapons have been argued to cause countries to think twice, or thrice, 
before pulling the trigger. Yet, the fact that triggers have almost been pulled, and 
the horrendous consequences of just one such nuclear „trial balloon“ make such 
a peace plan far from pristine. Having survived the Cold War, it is hardly advisab-
le to create many other „mini-Cold Wars“ among the nations of the earth in the 
hope that many will not ﬁght. If we have no wish to live „MADly“ in the pursuit 
of peace, and if costs anything short of obliteration are insufﬁcient except to par-
tition death tolls into fewer, larger piles, what remains in terms of making war 
unpalatable for political egoists?
The symmetries of warfare make the costliness of contests an ineffective way 
of pursuing peace. Nations that deter through the threat of unacceptable losses 
or risks can just as easily turn table on their opponents and become threatening. 
The security dilemma tells us that freedom from harm is zero-sum, increasing for 
one country necessarily only by decreasing the security of another. This assumes, 
however, that nations are necessarily insecure, that states and citizens live in the 
shadow of plausible harm. Even international relations realists (more appropriately 
labeled „pessimists“, though certainly the chosen title is better marketing) identify 
some conditions in which nations beneﬁt more from abstaining from aggression. 
Seeking power can lessen a state’s security if the power gained is not sufﬁcient 
to offset the costs incurred in the effort.3 For realists, this most plausibly happens 
when nations are likely to unite against an aggressor in response to a given act of 
aggression. However, the more general logic connects nicely with our conception 
of the two production functions. Nations (and persons) will avoid aggression when 
the gain that can be had by either party in prevailing over the other is insufﬁcient 
to compensate for the costs of ﬁghting.
Imagine that two men hold in their mouths opposite ends of a long stick. Ba-
lanced on the stick is a basket of fresh eggs. The two men are hungry. Neither can 
reach the basket with their hands. Dropping the stick to grab at the basket will 
3 Technically, realists diverge on the issue of whether power gain is always, or only sometimes, a 
net beneﬁt to states. However, offensive and defensive realists disagree only on whether states 
are ever dissuaded by the costs of obtaining power. They agree on the basic reasoning about 
why a given increase in power should ever become more of a burden to a state than it is worth.
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lead the basket to fall to the ground, causing the eggs to break. The only solution 
that beneﬁts either man is for both men to cooperate. The gain to be had must 
still be apportioned, and there can be disputes over who gets more, but the basic 
need to cooperate to obtain any beneﬁt can lead nations to cooperate. There exist 
technical caveats. For example, mutual beneﬁt invites the same kinds of competi-
tive behavior that one observes when two states face the prospect of mutual harm 
(i.e. playing „chicken“). Schelling offers the parable of two mountain climbers, tied 
together so that cooperation is essential for survival. He points out that the need 
to cooperate also allows the climbers to manipulate one another, depending on 
relative willingness to tempt fate and a fall from the mountain. Schelling used the 
metaphor to explain, in fact, how nuclear adversaries could continue to compete, 
but a side-effect of such competition is the revelation of how much, in fact, each 
side cares about issues in dispute. Khrushchev underestimated Kennedy in the 
Cuban Missile Crisis, a mistake that he did not repeat, and which did not lead to 
war in part because the intermediate mechanisms of which Schelling had concei-
ved allowed each leader to take the measure of the other without requiring a full 
military contest. War, and crises leading up to or averting war, are about learning 
as much as anything else. Knowing what leaders will accept in lieu of continued 
ﬁghting allows a war to end. Knowing what leaders will accept before war occurs 
can obviate the need for war. The interdependence of Europe, the United States, 
and a few other countries in the world creates a set of mechanisms that allow 
countries to communicate resolve in a manner similar to warfare, but not involving 
the actual use of deadly force. These mechanisms are not perfect, but especially 
when existing differences are not large, peace among nations can result from in-
terdependence. 
Now suppose that each of the two men possesses his own basket of eggs. If 
one can snatch the other’s basket while retaining his own, there is a temptation to 
do so. Suppose instead, however, that each of the baskets is tied to a large helium 
balloon or „bungee“ cord attached to a high tree limb. Now snatching at baskets 
is much more problematic. The assailant will most likely not be able to prevail, 
as the lighter-than-air-eggs slip through his grasp. He may even lose hold on his 
own eggs in the process, winding up worse than if he had remained producer and 
consumer rather than a poacher. If the basis of wealth is more difﬁcult to acquire 
through conquest, then conquest should subside. Nations can prefer to produce 
rather than steal as theft becomes more costly and ineffective. There are strong 
indications that this is precisely what has happened in the developed world. Ego-
ists intent only on their own gain have created economies that are now difﬁcult 
to take and proﬁt from through force. The conquest of the „Silicon Valley“ in Ca-
lifornia, for example, or Hong Kong by China when in British hands would lead 
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both places to decline greatly in value, while the conquerors would be harmed in 
turn by a reduction in their own investments in ﬁrms in these places. Making eco-
nomies „capture proof“ is not the primary motive of bankers, software engineers, 
or businessmen. Instead, like Adam Smith’s egoists who through no intention of 
their own create the „invisible hand“ of market forces, knowledge workers and ﬁ-
nanciers of a modern economy act in ways that have virtuous consequences for 
international peace whether or not they seek such an end. Let me touch on these 
points a bit further, since they are the most important.
One of the things we can notice about the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 was the 
tremendous cost. If the United States ever contemplated proﬁting from occupying 
Iraq (the evidence is clear that the US was not intent on capturing Iraqi oil ﬁelds), 
surely this is no longer the case. The war has been much more costly than any pro-
jection of the worth of the Iraqi economy. It would have been far cheaper to buy 
oil from Saddam Hussein than to steal it, for example, even if no one in Iraq had 
ever ﬁred a single shot at an American soldier. The costs of paying the salaries of 
troops deployed in the theater easily exceeds what the US can physically obtain 
from Iraqi soil. This implies two things. First, the value of conquest has declined 
precipitously for the most developed countries. Second, the motive for the United 
States in invading Iraq lies in immaterial objectives.
Nations turn to peace when war is mutually costly and mutually unproﬁtable, 
or when aggression is impossible (such as for weak nations against distant, capable 
ones). The nations of the world that are capable of aggression now ﬁnd that they 
face two types of potential targets, countries that have assets that are cheaper 
to buy than to steal (such as Iraqi oil), and countries that have assets that are va-
luable but that effectively cannot be stolen (intellectual and ﬁnancial capital of 
Hong Kong). The developed world has stopped using force against other developed 
countries, at least in order to conquer and colonize, because the production func-
tions of developed economies are difﬁcult to conquer and because the acquiring 
physical assets by means of modern military forces is expensive and inefﬁcient. 
Physical wealth can be stolen, but ideas and money ﬂee or fail to ﬂourish in the 
face of an invasion. The developed world has also stopped using force against 
developing states as a means of acquiring resources. It is much cheaper to „out- 
source“ political control to local ofﬁcials who will govern much more effectively 
– typically taking a large cut of available rents for themselves – than to try to go-
vern nations directly. Physical intervention is an option that continues to be exer-
cised, but this is typically temporary and is used only when local governments fail 
to be pliant, or when labor costs for occupying armies are low (as when European 
empire ﬂourished in the 16th through 19th centuries). The rising cost of the skilled 
labor needed to ﬁeld effective modern armies, combined with a secular decline in 
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commodity prices, and the opening up of the global economy, made empire con-
siderably less efﬁcient than trade.
Developing nations are considerably less capable of interstate aggression than 
are the countries of the developed world. Many of these countries lack effecti-
ve control over their own territories, let alone possessing the ability to intervene 
against neighbors. This weakness means that, while they may covet their neighbor’s 
assets, they typically lack the potential to act on these preferences. An almost to-
tal lack of warfare initiated by developing countries against the developed world 
is the result of impotence, certainly not of satisfaction. When developing nations 
ﬁght each other, it is often the case that territory or resources are at stake. This is 
a very typical pattern of warfare historically, but as I argue, this pattern has rece-
ded in the developed world. The irony is that poor nations, as with poor individuals, 
spend a considerable time stealing from each other, despite the fact that poverty 
means that the pickings are relatively slim. The rich states of the North have more 
worth taking, but what they have is well defended and increasingly difﬁcult to 
take. The mobility of the factors of production that are abundant in the developed 
world means that nations must cultivate, not capture, wealth. Thus, warfare in the 
north is nearly anachronistic, while war in the Southern hemisphere is much more 
common and more often reﬂects traditional patterns.
So why did the US invade Iraq? Policy differences remain a concern for poli-
tics among nations. The desire for inﬂuence, as opposed to afﬂuence, will continue 
to serve as an important, indeed the most signiﬁcant, motive for war. The United 
States and the Soviet Union were not vying for markets, but for market share in 
the market place of ideas. The ideological conﬂict between the superpowers was 
often accompanied by a competition for resources, but victory involved a change of 
policies rather than an exchange of territory. Nations that do not see „eye-to-eye“ 
can ﬁght to the teeth about whose voice will prevail. Peace among the developed 
Western nations is thus the result in part of consensus about how to order world 
affairs and of the presence of tools (international organizations) that deal with 
differences as discrete increments. A relatively large number of small problems can 
be addressed without substantiating the use of force, but if minor differences are 
left unresolved, the cumulative effect can be to motivate war. Deliberative bodies 
and regular ofﬁcial contact allow countries to defuse problems so that they do 
not accumulate.
Differences between Iraq and the United States involved major incompatibilities, 
rather than a series of minor frustrations. This meant that war was a possibility. 
Still, even major differences can be resolved provided the parties both have similar 
estimates of what is at stake. The problem for Iraq and the United States is precisely 
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that neither recognized the true costs of the war. It is clear now that US ofﬁcials 
underestimated the burden faced in governing Iraq, and overestimated the dangers 
of weapons of mass destruction. The United States may even come at some point 
to wish for the return of someone like Saddam to power, though such sentiments 
are unlikely to be expressed publicly by the current administration. For his part, 
Saddam appears to have expected that the US would not actually attack, or would 
quickly abandon the effort when confronted with substantial casualties. Given his 
superior knowledge of Iraqi, Saddam appears to have concluded that an American 
occupation would fail. Unfortunately, he never convinced the Americans.
Peace can prevail when nations lack the incentive to act aggressively. This re-
quires that conquest be unproﬁtable, or that proﬁtable conquest be unobtainable, 
either because nations are distant, or because potential aggressors are weak relative 
to target nations. Alternately, peace can prevail if nations can negotiate effectively, 
either because common, valuable ties serve to signal resolve, or because differences 
are compartmentalized and dealt with incrementally. Peace fails for reasons that 
mirror the causes of peace. Nations can ﬁght when they differ substantially in their 
preferred policies, and when at least one nation discounts or underestimates the 
resolve of an opponent to ﬁght if necessary. Nations can also ﬁght if occupation is 
proﬁtable, either because armies are cheap or because the spoils of victory are very 
large. Adam Smith’s egoistic capitalists create spoils that are spoiled by ﬁghting, 
or by occupation, making war unappealing to developed states.
Whither Democracy?
Many will note that I have forgotten to mention democracy as a solution to world 
peace. There is considerable evidence that democracies seldom make war on one 
another (though it is clear from this evidence that peace occurs only among de-
mocracies, and that even then it is only developed democracies that appear more 
mutually peaceful). Making the world safer by making it more democratic is as in-
tuitive and appealing as preaching peace or propagandizing war’s costs, and about 
as effective. Democracies do make war; the most disputatious nation in the world 
(my own country) is a democracy. The best evidence available says that democracy 
does not cause peace alone, but requires the presence of economic development 
(Hegre 2000). My research shows that the effects of democracy on conﬂict disap-
pear when one also measures the effects of capitalism. Nations that are prosperous 
and free economically are less war prone both generally and with each other, while 
democracy ceases to demonstrate any effect on the propensity toward war.
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There are good reasons why democracy is associated with peace, but does not 
itself cause peace. Domestically, within a country, democracy is literally political 
peace. Democracy alone among political systems requires peace to sustain itself. 
Though kings or dictators may topple, monarchy or autocracy remains. In cont-
rast, replacing a leader by force in a democracy manifestly means that the nation 
is no longer democratic. Thus, the conditions that must prevail internationally in 
order to have peace – an lack of motive among competitors to compete, or better 
mechanisms for resolving differences – must also prevail domestically in order to 
possess democracy. Losers must prefer accepting political defeat in a democracy 
to seeking to force a victory. Contested elections cannot lead to a contest, or the 
democracy ceases to exist. A preference for peace (the absence of a violent overth-
row or defense of ofﬁce) can occur if losing is not excessively costly, or if winning 
is not too lucrative. If governments offer the opportunity of too much rent-seeking, 
and considerable theft of wealth from domestic populations – in short if condi-
tions inimical to free markets are allowed to prevail – then the major alternative 
to victory in politics may be the loss of one’s wealth. In traditional societies, the 
major avenue to prosperity is through the state. Those who eschew political ofﬁce 
often ﬁnd that their homes and property have been given over to others. Since 
land, minerals, and other physical assets are hard for property owners to move, 
and relatively easy for the state to steal, the temptation of those in power is to 
take assets that belong to non-supporters and give them to supporters, or to the 
rulers themselves (Boix 2003).
Democracy becomes appealing to those with political power in a society when 
holding ofﬁce is no longer a prerequisite of prosperity. As nations depend more 
heavily for production on assets that can be moved, or that fail to enter or ﬂourish 
in the society unless they are largely left alone, then the reach of the state decli-
nes and the appeal of capturing diminishing rents from ofﬁce is reduced as well. 
The politically ambitious can consent to democracy when being defeated does not 
also mean impoverishment, and when victory does not imply vast riches. Though a 
sovereign may continue to seek opportunities for rent-seeking, the need to restrain 
oneself to sustain one’s own prosperity makes democracy feasible. What makes 
democracy appealing for political elites is the relatively low cost of governing th-
rough popular rule, and the efﬁciency gains obtained by oligarchic competition for 
ofﬁce. Government by consent requires no considerable investment in pacifying 
the populace, resources that can then be devoted elsewhere. Where autocracy is 
cheap, it is good to be king. But the burden of resisting the popular will, and of 
maintaining regressive redistributions of wealth, require that considerable wealth 
be expended on holding the people in check. If what can be gleaned (or ﬂeeced) 
from citizens is not large, then the incentive to rent seek through ofﬁce is removed. 
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Similarly, popular rule leads to more efﬁcient allocation of public goods. Intellectual 
and ﬁnancial capital beneﬁt intensely from limited, relatively efﬁcient government. 
Good government is the residual effect of the lack of a motive for rent seeking.
Capital and labor mobility, productivity gains associated with intellectual and 
ﬁnancial capital accumulation, and the crossing paths of declining rents and rising 
costs of suppression of the popular will in order to rule undemocratically all mirror 
the causes of international peace. After all, if the government of a society can no 
longer proﬁt from domestic oppression, it is very likely that the same will be true 
for a foreign power. Peace, and democracy, can occur when the agency that Adam 
Smith emphasizes occurs within, and between, societies. As egoists work in their 
own terms, for their own ends, they set the circumstances that allow international 
cooperation, and that prevent domestic occupation. Thus, the invisible hand has yet 
another function. The creation of prosperous economies prevent sovereigns from 
proﬁting from power and instead encourages the use of popular rule as a practi-
cal brake on political inefﬁciency. To put things succinctly, the same market forces 
that encourage efﬁcient allocation of resources, under the right circumstances lead 
also to democracy within nations and, between nations, to peace. Pursuing peace 
by making self-interest compatible with cooperation may be counter intuitive. It 
is certainly counter to the tradition of western political philosophy that says that 
good ends require good means and good intentions. However, Adam Smith exp-
lained how means and ends can function at apparent cross purposes. The greater 
good is indeed achievable, but it requires not „goodness“ but mechanisms that al-
low proﬁt and facilitate prosperity, leading those who desire gain (most of us) to 
cooperate rather than resort to force to obtain what we need and what we want. 
We see today how nations are divided between the prosperous and peaceful North 
and the fractious, impoverished South. Making peace is, indeed, incumbent on al-
lowing market forces, limiting the scope of government and of integrating nations 
through the web of economic exchanges that Adam Smith emphasized. 
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